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Abstract
Modeling the effect of context on interpretation, for the purposes of building intelligent systems,
has been a long-standing problem: qualities of logic can restrict accurate contextual interpret-
ation, even when there is only one context to consider. Stories offer a range of structures that
could extend formal theories of context, indicating how arrays of inferred contexts are able to
knit together, making an ontological reference that is specific to the particular set of circum-
stances embodied in the tale. This derived ontology shifts as the text unfolds, enabling constant
revision and the emergence of unexpected meanings. The described approach employs dynamic
knowledge representation techniques to model how these structures are built and changed. Two
new operators have been designed for this purpose: governance and causal conceptual agents. As
an example, a few lines from the story Red Riding Hood As a Dictator Would Tell It are used
to demonstrate how a story interpretive framework can be continually re-made, in a way that
produces unexpected interpretations of terms.
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1 Narrative and Formal Models of Context
1.1 Introduction
It is difficult for humans to make accurate interpretations across changing contexts, let alone
for machines to do so. Bruner observes that for logic, the “world remains invariant” [4, p. 50],
and Devlin explains how logical qualities can restrict accurate contextual interpretation, even
when there is only one context to consider [11]. This research examines how the structures of
stories enable multiple contexts to be managed, proposing two mechanisms (governance and
causal conceptual agency) to account for key aspects of the process. Systematic diagrams
represent the formal model [8] and display the mechanisms in animated form [7]. In this
paper, a few pivotal frames are provided to indicate their characteristics.
The original aim of this work was to inform the design of a computerized system for
intelligence analysis, that captured the way subjective (non-logical) perspectives evolve as
they influence each other, rather than how explicit facts add up [6]. Progress has been made
towards that system, which is still in development. Its formalisms are not covered here,
except to allude to the general mathematical choices made. Instead this paper presents a
model of some of the cognitive semantic dynamisms involved in understanding real-world
fiction. A companion paper reports on details of the implementation [15].
At the core of this paper are two mechanisms designed for that project: governance and
causal conceptual agency. These operators sit within a description of conceptual integration
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that is philosophically similar to established approaches in Discourse Processes, such as
Kintsch’s Construction-Integration Model, in which top-down and bottom-up inferences
negotiate [29]. Like that work, this model assumes that the text constrains and informs the
memory-based inferences that support reasoning about it. However, this approach departs
from previous models in that it is drawn from the issues concerning the composition of
compelling fiction. It began with a fiction writer’s question: how does a reader anticipate
the end of a story she or he cannot predict?
In order to render this artistic concern in the very different field of knowledge represent-
ation, a survey of approaches was made, to identify gaps in current models of conceptual
structure [8]. Within that domain, the focus was ontological interoperability, which has
some known, long-standing problems [40]. One of these issues is directly relevant to the
phenomenon of interest: it is difficult to design a system that can automatically bridge
incompatible conceptual networks, such as the kind that exist in different knowledge bases.
One ontology cannot evolve into another, so that non-logical structures emerge that seem
like a natural evolution. I use this problem to frame how stories enable progressive reasoning
in ways that differ from current formal models of contextual interpretation.
To clarify this phenomenon, consider the title and first lines of the following story:
Red Riding Hood as a Dictator Would Tell It
Once upon a time, there was a poor, weak wolf. It was gentle and kindly
and had a heart of gold [49, p. 230].
Reading from the first phrase, Red Riding Hood, to the last phrase heart of gold, the
reader is led through several different states of expectation regarding themes and events:
from a fairytale scenario, to the anticipation of humor and irony mixed with that fairytale
scenario (when addition of the dictator is mentioned), and then to the unexpected focus on
the wolf with gentle qualities. In order to maintain sense as these expectations shift, some
conceptual structures remain stable while others alter. How does this dynamism occur? This
paper will outline the way conceptual structure can be built, integrated and revised through
mechanisms central to fiction writing.
The resulting model is represented using animations that use conventions of knowledge
representation, and extended with approaches such as those of Fauconnier and Turner [13],
and Holyoak and Thagard [24] to include dynamism. An animated version of this example
can be found online [7]. Figure 1 is a screenshot from this animation, which depicts some of
the inferences involved in interpreting the example.
As an introduction, simply notice the bands running across the frame of Figure 2; there
are two groups: those at the top, which represent general knowledge structures, and those at
the bottom, which represent new, emerging interpretive structure. Connections are woven
between them as the text progresses. Governance, a new operator, is one of the facilitators
of this movement. In Figure 1, a governing node is indicated by the color blue, with lines
indicating the direction of effect. Causal concept agents are collected in the third situation
band from the bottom, fulfilling criteria that will be described in a moment. These new
features record the stages of the shift from the general (top) to the specific (bottom), where
the new derived ontology is built and changed.
A story’s ability to adjust its own frame of reference could offer fresh insight into managing
conceptual conflict in systems such as knowledge bases. It could also address the “significant
gap” in research on narrative inference identified by Arthur Graesser, who asks “how does
the point of a story systematically emerge from the configuration of important goals, actions,
obstacles, conflicts, and resolutions expressed in the plot?” [16, p. 239]. This paper proposes
that part of the answer can be found in the mechanisms used by a story to handle incompatible
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Figure 1 Conceptual structure built by the title of Red Riding Hood as a Dictator Would Tell It
weaves aspects of general inferences (top) into a new, derived interpretive structure (bottom).
conceptual structures. It will indicate how new referential structure is progressively derived,
enabling changes in the interpretation of the terms it supports. Sowa states that a dynamic
notion of ontology such as this is needed, to reflect the way the meaning of a word “is
unstable and dynamically evolving as it is used in different contexts” [41, p. 245]. This work
models some of the structures used by a story to achieve this.
2 Composing the Problem
2.1 Ontology in knowledge bases and stories
The first departure from current literature is the units considered to be fundamental to stories.
Formal analyses of narrative often revolve around events and characters in the storyworld
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[46, 35, 23], and while these aspects are important, and can be entailed in the abstractions I
use, they are not the focus. Instead, this work concerns how stories build and transform the
conceptual structure used to make inferences during its own interpretation. I refer to this
framework as a derived ontology [15].
A derived ontology is the story’s reference framework, one that contains the operating
parameters of the story itself, including causal information that enables a reader to understand
not only what is happening, but what can happen. It includes but goes beyond the notions
of suyet or discours [26], because it entails non-explicit inferences along with the explicit
textual devices, and zooms into the granularity of how such structure is built and changed at
a conceptual level, so some ideas are deliberately rendered as more important than others.
The term derived ontology captures these qualities and also indicates fundamental similarities
with the computer science notion of ontology. The two instances differ in a few important
ways, however.
The term ontology was first used in philosophy by Aristotle to refer to the study of being
[34, p. 3], and has since been adapted to serve computer science. Here, an ontology is a
frame of reference that accounts for a certain view of the world [34, p. 3], and this is also my
definition in relation to stories. In both cases, an ontology provides the reference framework
used to define terms, similar to a built-in dictionary. It is a “systematic account” of the
entities assumed to exist in a domain of interest, as well as the relationships between them
[19]. Both stories and knowledge bases can be seen as interpretive machines, in the sense
that each relies on an ontology (or something like it) to churn out interpretation. In both
stories and knowledge base design, ontology is the reference framework used to make accurate
interpretations.
These similarities can lead to confusion regarding the differences. The first distinction
concerns generality versus specificity. In computer science, even though an ontology can
manifest in a range of different forms [38, p. vi], the common denominator is that it is a
static corpus of general reference terms, which have a formal expression [37, p. 61][38, p. vi].
The more this kind of ontology is tailored to a particular domain, the less compatible it will
be with those in other systems, a quality termed heterogeneous [1, p. 190],[48, p. 164]. In
practical terms, this makes a formal ontology similar to a context, because the more specific
it is, the more it will be limited to that particular circumstance, and its information less easy
to preserve as it is carried to other instances. For this reason, the terms in formal ontologies
are chosen to have as “much generality as possible to ensure reusability” [38, p. v]. In this
work, systems such as this are thus referred to as a general ontologies.
A story does use general references such as this, but then goes further. It draws on
numerous general references, and then manipulates elements from them, adding structure
until the resulting interpretive framework is unique to the tale. This is a novel contribution
of this research: identifying the way that stories construct a new, refined reference situation.
Interestingly, the new derived reference will contain some non-logical structure that does
not exist in its sources. To a reader of narrative, these concepts might seem unexpected and
be less easy to predict [4, p. 12]. There are numerous ways the notion unexpected can be
defined, it is framed here in relation to paradigms of general assumed knowledge, such as that
found in a general ontology. An unexpected conceptual structure is one that is incompatible
with commonly known assumption: the sort of structure embodied in a general ontology.
The importance of such digression in narrative has been noted across Narratology [23, 3],
Discourse Processes [47], and Narrative Psychology [5, 44]. My definition of unexpected
includes the way a breach in assumed knowledge can be disruptive, in the manner of Kuhn’s
“anomaly” which provokes transformation of scientific paradigms [30, p. 6].
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Such breach is significant due to the different way systems of logic and story handle
anomalous information. In prescriptive logical systems, problems arise when general ontologies
encounter unexpected information, and these are so common that a number of approaches
have emerged to address them [32]. Most involve some sort of standardisation of terms
to eliminate conflict between conceptual structures [38, p. 5]. John Sowa states, “Any
incompleteness, distortions, or restrictions in the framework of categories must inevitably
omit the generality of every program or database that uses those categories” [40, p. 51].
However, such limits and distortions are an integral aspect of a story’s ability to make sense,
and then re-make that sense differently.
Stories can handle unexpected information due to mechanisms that manage the barriers
of context. A context is defined as a limited characterization of reality, which is specific
to the peculiarities of a particular circumstance, and contains elements that could not be
found easily in other situations. It is information that “is embedded in a specific domain
or situation” [39, p. 51], in such a way that information from outside that context might
be anomalous. Due to our use of Keith Devlin’s formal system, Layered Formalism and
Zooming (LFZ) [11], we refer to a context as a situation when it takes the form of a discrete
conceptual structure. This kind of situation has features in common with a heterogeneous
ontology, in that its limits can make it difficult to preserve information when it is transferred.
In knowledge base design, this can cause problems when different systems try to interact.
This is usually addressed through the creation of a large, comprehensive ontology in which
all reference frameworks can be situated [32] or the standardization of divergent conceptual
structure so that it does not lead to “inconsistent interpretations and uses of knowledge” [20,
pp. 381-382]. By contrast, stories leverage such inconsistencies to emulate the flux of the
open, real world. Rather than being supported by a single general ontology, or eliminating
incompatible ideas, a story’s reference framework enables numerous, limited and diverse
conceptual networks to temporarily agree, before changing to accommodate the next chunk
of text.
A final area of potential confusion between ontology in the two fields concerns their
relationship to logic. In computer-orientated methods, the semantic aspect of the ontology is
usually managed by logical rules [40, p. 12], [22, p.30]. In the fictional instance, semantics are
structured according to the associative priorities of the story. This structure might contain
logical elements, but will also contain many that are not – as Bruner notes, story and logical
structures are different modes of thought, “irreducible to one another” [4, p. 11]. When
text is interpreted in computer science, the semantic and logical aspects of an ontology are
usually the same entity, whereas my model separates them. In the design of a knowledge
base, a possible way to handle this would be to build three levels: 1) the semantics of the
story ontology, which is structured according to the relations expressed by the story and its
reference frameworks; 2) the constructive processes that underpin formation of the story
ontology; 3) the logical formalisms that make it computational [15]. Only the first two levels
are explored here.
3 Supporting Literature
Modeling contextual inference in unfolding narrative involves several fields, so the supporting
literature was drawn from a range of research areas. The following emerged as pertinent:
narratological studies on the progressive effects of an unfolding story [44, 27], theories of
narrative inference [18, 45, 17], theories of context interpretation and inference [2, 36, 11],
current approaches to conceptual integration in knowledge systems [41, 1, 32], and formalisms
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that concern the representation of narrative conceptual structure [24, 13], as well as their
transformation [42, 30]. Of these, a few theories were fundamental to this research.
Foremost was the work of Keith Devlin, whose development of situation theory provided
a philosophical foundation and a possible formal framework for its realization. His extension
of situation theory, Layered Formalism and Zooming (LFZ), is a formal means of expressing
the limits of context and the transfer information between them [10]. Devlin’s work was
extended by our collaborator Goranson to include the narrative properties described here
[15]. Devlin’s foundations allows for more robust formal methods to be employed in this
work.
Discourse Processes was also important, to show how specifics at the perceptive level
trigger and restrict generic knowledge inferences [29, p. 125]. Like Kintsch’s Construction
Integration (CI) model, this work describes continuous conceptual retrieval and adjustment,
where only a few nodes actively contribute to the meaning of a node, yet can be easily expanded
due to a persistent connection with larger memory structures [28, p. 74]. Although memory
and explanation-based processes [21] could both be read into this work, my abstractions
are different, so forms of retrieval such as this will manifest and be triggered in relation to
different factors. The key difference is ontological conflict; when these models account for
contradictions in text [21, p. 244][28, p. 181], they are referring to factual inconsistencies
rather than shifts in fundamental definitions of terms. Due to this, and the narrative
mechanisms needed to manage it, my expression of these processes differs.
This approach also diverges from Narratology, which usually considers events and char-
acters to be the main features [43, 27, 35, 46]. Michael Toolan examines how text can
retroactively attribute importance to particular events, making them cohere in ways that
were “unforeseen but foreseeable” [43, p. 215]. In a more formal approach that also focuses
on events, Tom Trabasso diagrams the causal dependence of actions in narrative [46, 33],
and collaborates with Graesser to consider the forms of inference that produce them [17].
In these cases, the focus on events and activities in the storyworld overlooks a key feature
of unfolding narrative: the way the incremental nature of reading can radically change
the interpretation of its terms. Cognitive scientist Paul Thagard has argued that further
attention to progressive revision is needed to explain “why some revisions are harder to
make than others and why some revisions have more global effects” [42, p. 20]. Thagard’s
diagrams of conceptual change thus provided insights about how contexts evolve [42].
To capture the finer operations of story inference, this approach also draws from Fauconnier
and Turner’s models of conceptual blending, in which one analogical space supplies conceptual
structure, while another is projected into it, making its structures interpretively dominant
[13, p. 321]. Fauconnier and Turner do not model the dynamics in the case of an unfolding
narrative, however. This means their analogical structure can rest on a fixed general ontology,
and the modifications of one situation towards another can be accounted for switching
complementary nodes on and off [13, p. 321], rather than the imposition of one structure
onto another, so that new structures are formed.
From this survey, several properties of inference in stories emerged as being potentially
useful additions to computational models.
4 A Model of Contextual Reinterpretation
Several new mechanisms enable the integration and shift of multiple contexts. Following is
an overview of that process, along with a summary of its taxonomic elements.
As a story unfolds, it provokes:
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Figure 2 Example of layout, with general and interpretive situations grouped together.
1. Multiple, limited inferences which each exhibit properties of context that can make
their structures incompatible. These inferences can be connected by
2. Causal Conceptual Agents, which contain new structure capable of bridging incom-
patible inferences. Those new relationships are recorded in a
3. Meta-situation, in which the ontological structures supporting the various inferences
are organized in relation to each other: an ontology of ontologies. This arrangement
follows relationships of
4. Governance, which enables situations to impose their structures on each other to modify
the terms of one network towards another. Altogether, this produces a new reference
framework.
Together, these structures form a derived ontology. A summary of the graphical method
follows.
In Figure 2, bands are grouped at the top and bottom of the diagram. These are all
situations, but the two groups do not perform the same role. Their division represents
complementary aspects of interpretation: at the top are situations drawn from general
ontologies (the Ontology Space), while at the bottom, the agent network is recorded (the
Interpretation Space). The incoming text of the story appears across the middle, so that
operators can easily weave structure outwards from it, across the two domains.
The following operators build structure over this framework:
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Name / Function Representation Graphic
Incoming Text Token
Rectangular box with incom-
ing text inside
Node
Rounded box with concepts in-
side
Link Line
Situation Encircling box
Pusher Hammer shape
Puller Suction shape
Funnel Open V shape
Dot Dot
Dot (suspended situation) Dot with white center
Wedge
Black triangle, pointing in dir-
ection of connection
Of these taxonomic items, the first three (Incoming Text Token, Nodes, Links) are
common to conventional methods of knowledge representation. The next three operators
(Situation, Pusher, Puller) are new, and capture the behavior of conceptual situations.
The first is an encircling box that groups entities to show how their combined structure
operates as a single functional unit. The pusher and puller depict the dynamic extraction of
subset reference situations.
The Funnel instigates change, and as such, is the central structure-building device in this
model. In terms of narrative apprehension, it represents an associative connection between
actual text and the inferences it provokes. In the graphical depiction, it behaves like a moving
arrow, drawing a link between any two objects and creating an attachment between them.
Contact with a funnel can change the position and arrangement of concepts, leaving behind
an association between the areas of transference. That persistent connection is demonstrated
by a grey line. Dots and wedges are superficial indicators that make it easier to decipher the
graphical depictions. Dots show where a line starts and ends, like an anchor. Wedges show
the direction in which a connection is made, if it is difficult to discern.
There are also eight key states. A state indicates what sort of influence a taxonomic
element has over its surrounding objects. In order to record the simultaneous development
of many elements, states are represented by colors, and can apply to all graphical objects.
The colors are not intrinsic to the process being represented, but the differentiation between
kinds of activity is important. The states are:
Neutral (white)
Suspended (encircled by a dotted line)
Persistent (grey)
Activation (light yellow)
Association-Forming (orange)
Conflict (red)
Transformative (purple)
Governing (blue)
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Neutral (black on white) indicates that the object exists. A dotted black line indicates
suspension, which means the object tentatively exists. A node is registered as tentative
when an inference is made that could be salient, but is not yet confirmed (suspension is
another novel feature). Grey signifies that an object has been built and is now inactive
but persistent. Yellow signals the activation of an existing object. Orange can associate
objects. Red indicates a conflict between associations. At the far end of the spectrum, purple
signifies the resolution of conflict, while blue indicates governance. Both can modify existing
structures.
This architecture was used to map the title and first lines of the story Red Riding Hood
as a Dictator Would Tell It [49] (see above for these lines of text). The story is narrated
from the perspective of a sensitive wolf that complains about being persecuted by a girl and
her grandmother [49, p. 230]. He explains that one day he wandered into the old lady”s
home and was so startled by her that he was forced to eat her. The full story can be found
in The Trials and Tribulations of Little Red Riding Hood [49]. The animated analysis of
these lines can be found online [7].
4.1 Multiple, limited inferences
My example begins when the title Red Riding Hood as a Dictator Would Tell It is apprehended.
In discourse process models, comprehension begins with a trigger that calls up memory
structures [21]; here, such information is drawn from a form of general cultural memory
instead. The distinction reflects the phenomenon of interest: part of the skill of professional
writing is to judge which inferences can reasonably be assumed of any reader, based on what
sort of information is generally known, and what is not. This general knowledge is akin to
Arthur Graesser’s “generic knowledge structures” [17], and is also similar to the artificial
intelligence notion of “common ground”[9, p. 320], where the assumed shared knowledge is
the kind a writer can expect of fiction readers they have never met: an example is the kind
of information contained in Wikipedia. For ease of reference, that assumed mass audience is
referred to as the reader, and the shared general cultural memory is collected in the global
ontology.
In knowledge base design, commonly known examples that might populate the global
ontology could include Cyc, WordNet [40, p. 412] or the coming standard that will enable the
semantic web [25, pp. 58-59]. Whether for humans, my model, or a computer implementation,
this is only the starting point of interpretation, the place from which most foundational
reference situations are drawn. Graphically, I depict this collection as a single situation band,
running across the top of the frame.
When the first phrase is apprehended, “Red Riding Hood”, an inferred cluster of terms
associated with the fairytale Red Riding Hood is extracted from the global ontology. A phrase
such as this only activates a limited selection of terms from a general reference framework -
this was observed by Kintsch [28, p. 74]. Graesser has referred to a partial inference such as
this as a subset of generic knowledge [17, p. 374], and I develop the idea further, to emphasize
its properties of context. For example, Red Riding Hood is supported by limited conceptual
networks regarding the fairytale, and few others. The notion of dictator is supported by a few
inferences regarding political control and self-aggrandisement. If the supporting ontologies of
these terms do not accommodate each other, it might be difficult to relate them on any level.
The story will show how they can be linked in this particular circumstance, by adding new
structure.
In the graphical example, the extraction of a subset situation occurs when a situation
band titled “Red Riding Hood” is pulled out of the global ontology and its dictionary, and
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rests beneath them, to serve as the first point of reference for further text. The dictionary
provides simple dictionary definitions for individual words, whereas the global ontology
provides higher-level common knowledge, such as the associations commonly related to the
phrase “Red Riding Hood”. The subset titled “Red Riding Hood” is now characterized in
terms of the network of terms it contains (I refer to this overall characterization as a scope).
In this case, the scope concerns the fairytale Red Riding Hood. The graphical node bears this
title, standing in for the terms related to it.
When the term “dictator”, is apprehended, it is tested against the “Red Riding Hood”
situation, and no exact match of terms are found. Another subset must be extracted from
the global ontology, to support it. Finally, with the phrase “would tell it”, a third round
of inferencing is provoked. This time, a subset that supports the meta-fictional idea of a
“narrator” is extracted. In Figure 1, these subset inferences are depicted as three situation
bands, each layered under the next.
When the “Meta Story” situation becomes activated, possible connections become available
between the Red Riding Hood and Dictator inferences. Nefarious qualities of the dictator
might connect with the role of narrator, after more information is gathered. Perhaps the
fairytale plot will feature events from World War II. The focus of this story, both explicitly
and implicitly, concerns the bridging of two incompatible situations, but more information is
needed to understand how. To confirm which elements will be used and connected, another
feature is needed: conceptual agents.
4.2 Causal conceptual agents
Causality is famously difficult to quantify, and the survey of causal philosophy conducted in
relation to agency in narrative is covered elsewhere (see [8]). From that literature, Einhorn
and Hogarth’s Judging Probable Cause was foundational, for the way it describes how causal
agency emerges in relation to a contextual field of reference [12, p. 5]. In narrative-related
theory, it is common to conceive of agents as characters, and causality as a counterfactual
dependence of actions or events (see literature review, above, especially [46]). However, in
this work, agency occurs in the context of differing ontological structures. The focus is
therefore an aspect of causality more salient to poetics: where causality in story is not a chain
of dependence, but a domain of transitions that fit. In this framework, agency is conceptual
structure that is able to act on one ontological structure so that it turns into another.
Einhorn and Hogarth’s description of causal agency is embodied in two parameters:
Foreground (causal agents) and Background (causal fields). These characteristics replaced
the single focal situation in Devlin’s formal model of contextual interpretation, LFZ, which
provided a logical foundation for the formal expression of this work. Graphically, these
parameters are represented as horizontal situation bands that run along the bottom of
the page (Figure 2). The foreground band contains nodes that have been identified as
conceptual agents, because they exhibit new linking structure. A graphical example in
Figure 1, above, would be the node “Narrator might be a dictator”. The central band in
this cluster, thematic interpretation, records the most dominant of these, to indicate the
overall themes of the story. The bottom-most situation band, background, is composed of
nodes that stand in for each inferred reference situation. I refer to these as ambassadors,
which will be discussed in the next section.
Agents emerge from the field by virtue of their novel structure (that is, novel compared
with what already exists in the reference situations). Their degree of agency is determined by
their novelty, as well as how much conceptual structure they are able to link. For example,
when the “Meta Story” situation is applied to the whole field, the “Red Riding Hood” and
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“Dictator” subsets are cast as separate yet “parallel” situations, ones that will be compared
as part of the storytelling. This parallel quality is indicated by the text, with the linking
phrase “as a . . . would tell it” but does not exist in any of the subset reference ontologies
in isolation. The notion has been derived in relation to their combination. In this case,
the node “parallel stories” is an agent because it connects all three subset situations with
structure that is novel (compared with what exists in the subset reference situations).
In the implementation, new and transformative structure is informed by Michael Leyton’s
work on geometric transformation, which illustrates how the evolving topological structures
can indicate causal connection [31, p. 3]. When represented as a conceptual network, an
ontology endows a story’s semantic perspective with structure. When the system searches
for structure that will enable transitions between incompatible conceptual structures, it will
use semantically-guided topologies to reason about it [14]. Logically, this is expressed as a
two-sorted logic, where the second sort uses categoric arrows to reason over situations. This
allows semantic-free representation of situations, including those whose explicit facts are
unknown.
Causal conceptual agents emerge in relation to the background context being established
by the text. In order to examine how that background is composed, let us turn to the
meta-situation.
4.3 The Background : contextualizing contexts
The meta-situation is like an orrery, in the sense that its tokens stand in for a more complex
system. Here, in microcosm, relationships between general reference frameworks are built
and changed. This miniature is established through gradual honing: general reference
frameworks become subsets, which in turn are abstracted as individual nodes, which I refer
to as ambassadors. Ambassador nodes contain only the most essential elements of the sources
from which they were drawn, and are arranged in the meta-situation. Kitsch remarks on the
way activated nodes concern only the few elements of general knowledge that are relevant
[28, p. 74]; this idea goes further to note how these fragments are positioned in relation to
each other by the story. As the text progresses, these tokens are manipulated to reflect the
structural priorities of the tale. They carry the relevant aspects of their sources, but have the
advantage of being composed of limited conceptual networks, rather than massive general
ontologies (although they remain persistently connected to each other), and so are easier to
manipulate and modify.
The arrangement of ambassadors, in the form of a meta-situation, serves as an ongoing
reference for the incoming text. Agency is relative to a causal field [12, p. 6], and the meta-
situation serves as that field. It informs and situates the emerging agents. In implementation,
the system will identify nodes as ambassadors for the Background situation band if they
represent a subset of a reference situation but contain no new structure. Their purpose is to
record how the text is building relationships between the reference situations, including which
are dominant (dominance will be discussed in a moment). Due to the way the meta-situation
shifts as the text progresses, it enables the same word to be interpreted differently as the
story unfolds.
Consider the interpretation of “wolf” that would be inferred at different stages of the
example story. By itself, the word wolf might be defined as a wild woodland creature with
some doglike qualities, and a system using a single ontology would then use this definition as
the basis of a composition of facts. In narrative, when the first phrase of the title is parsed,
“Red Riding Hood” a quick contextualization occurs: any wolf mentioned at this point would
be subject to the terms of the “Red Riding Hood” situation, which would produce the
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Figure 3 Looking up a word when a single general ontology is the reference.
definition that the wolf is a predatorial character who plans to eat a little girl, perhaps with
sexual menace. Below are two illustrations by a collaborator to contrast two different ways
“wolf” can be interpreted in this situation [14]. Figure 3 shows the look up when there is a
single ontology. Figure shows how the subset situation Red Riding Hood could impose its
structure to create a more nuanced definition of wolf.
In Figure 3, the definition of ’wolf’ is always the same; Figure 4 shows a system in which
the terms used to interpret a word can shift with every subset added. The second instance
reflects this research, to imitate the way story comprehension can involve many subsets,
acting simultaneously.
In Red Riding Hood as a Dictator Would Tell It, the nuance does not stop there. The
newly defined fairytale ’wolf’ is then redefined by the dictator’s situation, so that it becomes
a character in a story (with predatorial menace) which is of interest to a dictator. By the end
of the sentence “It was gentle and kindly and had a heart of gold” [49], the wolf is a dictator,
who is narrating the story, and endowed with the dictatorly quality of perverting the truth.
The meta-situation makes co-operation between inferences possible because it records
the relationship between them. The variety of means by which this occurs is a large topic of
enquiry in itself, and is the subject of ongoing investigation. The basic foundation includes
the dynamic that when situations relate to each other, they follow properties of governance.
4.4 Governance
The term governance refers to a form of structural imposition. As many inferred situations
might compete to have their structures used by the story, a method is needed to designate
which take priority; governance fulfills this role. But it is not simply a prioritization method.
It also accounts for the adjustments that conceptual structures can perform on each other,
modifying conceptual structures so they can connect. In the graphical method, governance
is indicated by the color blue (see Figure 1). When one node governs another, the governing
node flashes blue and connects to it, and its effect is recorded in the addition or alteration of
structure.
Governance can operate at a range of degrees. Its most far-reaching form is demonstrated
by the final version of the derived ontology. When a story reaches its end, the final version of
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Figure 4 Looking up wolf when each subset reference has different parameters.
the derived ontology acts on the entire tale, retroactively imparting its associative priorities
on all previous structures. This can result in major, meaning-altering revisions of the entire
network.
In its most local form, governance can act through an individual word, such as the way
“wolf” can be considered in relation to the phrase “there was a poor, weak wolf.” Here, the
words “poor” and “weak” are interpreted on the terms of the governing word, “wolf”. Their
associative range thus conforms to a scope of qualities appropriate to a fairytale wolf.
Between these two extremes is the most frequently used governance operation. Every
time a text chunk appears, a subset situation is used to interpret it. This subset governs the
incoming text chunk, in order to provide source structure for that interpretation.
The notion of governance is novel, but is informed by Paul Thagard’s research on
conceptual change. In Conceptual Revolutions, Thagard discusses the transition between
two competing theories of combustion, which share the common concept “wood burns” [42,
p. 105]. This common node operates as a limited point of attachment between the two
incompatible paradigms, and in Thagard’s diagrams, acts as a pivot between them.
In narrative, a conceptual agent performs this pivotal role. As the old conceptual
framework turns into a new one, the pivot pulls the old structure onto new terms. In a
story, there are numerous pivotal points such as this, acting in concert to indicate how one
temporarily fixed point can become the next, until the end. Some conceptual structure
remain stable while others change. Interpretation can thus evolve and yet comprehension
persists, with each temporarily stable point helping to carry the reader to the end.
In a practical sense, governance modifications can occur in numerous ways: one situation
might surrender to the associative priorities of the other, or some of its terms might be
bent in order to connect to it. The kinds of modification, and under what circumstances
they activate, requires further work. More investigation is also required in relation to other
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aspects of the model: more examples are needed, to explore and refine the taxonomy. In
terms of the graphical expression, a richer representation is required for the structure of
ambassadors, so it is easier to assess the way they bridge, overlap or conflict with each other.
These issues are the subject of ongoing work and collaboration.
In the meantime, this model offers two novel mechanisms towards the issue of bridging
incompatible contexts in computable models. It describes how causal conceptual agents
use principles of governance to build unexpected conceptual structures. Their dynamic
connections thread the narrative transitions together, enabling a reader to track how the
themes and central ideas in a story evolve. At each step, the interpretation of the terms of
the story alters, as the inferred situations adjust their relationship with each other.
5 Conclusion
This paper presents a novel system to model how narratives manipulate meaning in dynamic
and complex ways. Four features of evolving interpretation in stories were identified.
As a tale unfolds, it provokes multiple inferences which have properties of contextual
limitation. These are connected together by conceptual agents, which emerge when different
subset situations are applied to incoming text, in such a way that new structure emerges.
In order to determine how their differing reference networks should relate, principles of
governance organize and modify tokens drawn from them. This creates a meta-situation,
in which tokens of the supporting ontological structures are prioritized and arranged, shifting
as the story unfolds. Overall, this constructs a new reference framework, one that is a
derivation of the general reference frameworks used, and is specific to a particular set of
circumstances embodied by the tale.
These factors combine to give a sense that the interpretative framework of the story
is evolving. Narrative mechanisms such as this could offer new insight into problems of
interoperability found in knowledge base design. Further study will be pursued to further
refine the details of how this process occurs, and shed further light on how an assumed reader
is able to anticipate structures they cannot predict.
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